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Death by Bullying:
A Comparative Culpability
Proposal
Audrey Rogers*
On-line connectedness through social media sites on the
internet has exacerbated all aspects of adolescent angst, from
feelings of isolation, lack of popularity, complicated social
hierarchies, exclusion, teasing, and bullying. Proposals to
address cyber-bullying typically suggest school-based solutions
such as workshops, sensitivity training and codes of conduct. 1
In some instances, cyber-bullying has led to civil actions such
as defamation, and infliction of emotional harm, mostly
without success.2 A less frequent avenue is the criminal law to
stop the bullying. When used, the typical charges are for
criminal harassment or stalking.3 In one highly-publicized
case, federal prosecutors unsuccessfully employed a computer
hacking statute to prosecute Lori Drew who created a fictitious
on-line persona to bully thirteen-year old, Megan Meier, after
the state found no grounds to prosecute her.4 Megan hanged
herself upon being told by her bully that “the world would be a
Audrey Rogers, 2014. My thanks to my colleagues at Pace Law School for
their comments and suggestions, and to research assistant Jenna Beirlein.
1. See, e.g., Naomi Harlin Goodno, How Public Schools Can
Constitutionally Halt Cyberbullying: A Model Cyberbullying Policy That
Considers First Amendment, Due Process, and Fourth Amendment
Challenges, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 641 (2011); Lawrence M. Paska,
Cyberbullying from Classroom to Courtroom: Contemporary Approaches to
Protecting Children in a Digital Age, 22 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 535 (2012).
2. See, e.g., Finkel v. Dauber, 906 N.Y.S.2d 697 (Sup. Ct. 2010)
(summary judgment granted to defendant).
3. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-183 (2014); WASH. REV. CODE §
9A.46.110 (2014). See generally Shira Auerback, Note, Screening Out
Cyberbullies: Remedies for Victims on the Internet Playground, 30 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1641 (2009).
4. See United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 451 (C.D. Cal. 2009). See
generally Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1561, 1569 (2010).
*
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better place without you.”5 Finding that its harassment statute
did not cover the incident, the state found no grounds to
prosecute Drew.6
The extreme consequence of bullying manifested in the
Drew case - suicide - is occurring with alarming regularity.7
There is a growing popular sense, as exemplified by the coining
of the term “bullycide,” that cyber-bullying is a mounting
problem that is not responding to other curbing measures, such
as school conduct codes, civil actions, or more minor criminal
This article explores the possibility and
sanctions.8
advisability of imposing homicide charges against bullies, a
controversial approach because of the serious causation
questions it poses. Nonetheless, there is precedent for holding
a person criminally culpable for a victim’s suicide. A notorious
case involved the head of the Ku Klux Klan who was convicted
of murder after the woman he raped killed herself by
swallowing poison, “distracted by pain and shame so inflicted
upon her.”9 Some may see her shame as analogous to gay teens
who commit suicide after being bullied about their sexual
orientation. But perhaps the law should not demand that free
will be completely lacking before a person is charged for
another’s suicide. In other instances such as provocation, the
criminal law recognizes that the relationship between victim
and defendant shapes culpability.
This article explores
whether it is feasible and desirable to do so with suicides.
Part I provides background on cyber-bullying with a focus
on two highly-publicized cases. Causation rules and their
application in suicide-by-victim cases are laid out in Part II.
Part III assesses whether homicides charges would be possible

5. See Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 452.
6. See Christopher Maag, A Hoax Turned Fatal Draws Anger but No
Charges,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Nov.
28,
2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/28/us/28hoax.html.
7. David Badash, Yet ANOTHER Teen Suicide This Week: Anti-Gay
Bullying Blamed, NEW CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (Jan. 21, 2011),
http://thenewcivilrightsmovement.com/yet-another-teen-suicide-this-weekanti-gay-bullying-blamed/news/2011/01/21/16889.
8. Apparently coined by journalist Neil Marr and anti-bulling expert
Tim Field in their book on bullying in England. See NEIL MARR & TIM FIELD,
BULLYCIDE: DEATH AT PLAYTIME (2001).
9. Stephenson v. State, 179 N.E. 633, 635 (Ind. 1932).
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against a bully. It suggests the all-or-nothing approach to
causation, and its exceptions are based on artificial and
outmoded reasoning. For example, using the Stephenson
reasoning, a prosecutor would have to paint a bullying victim
as mentally unstable and irresponsible. For victims of bullying
who are considering suicide, these prosecutions reinforce their
sense of hopelessness and helplessness because they blame the
bully for the victims’ suicidal acts. The goal, instead, should be
to empower bullying victims to seek other avenues to escape
their bullies, to feel that they have choices; and that suicide is
not an option. The bully should be punished, but the focus
should be on his actions, not on the victim’s response. Using a
comparative causation analysis, as some scholars propose, we
look to a person’s role in another’s death and punish according
to the amount he contributed to the death. Factors such as the
imbalance of power between the bully and his victim, and the
nature and severity of the bullying should be considered in
determining whether a person who has a role in another’s
suicide should be punished.
I.

Background

A. Traditional Bullying
There is no universally accepted definition of bullying, but
a number of states recently have passed school-based antibullying legislation, with different definitions of bullying. For
example, one jurisdiction states bullying consists of
“systematically and chronically inflicting physical hurt or
psychological distress on one or more students and may
involve: (1) Teasing; (2) Social exclusion; (3) Threat; (4)
Intimidation; (5) Stalking; (6) Physical violence; (7) Theft; (8)
Sexual, religious, or racial harassment; (9) Public humiliation;
or (10) Destruction of property.”10 Other states are less
detailed, defining bullying as follows: “any intentional written,
verbal, electronic, or physical act” that a student has exhibited
toward another particular student more than once” that causes
mental or physical harm, and “is sufficiently severe, persistent,
10. FLA. STAT. § 1006.147(3) (2010).
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or pervasive that it creates an intimidating, threatening, or
abusive educational environment for the other student.11
The lack of a standard definition of bullying is
problematic as it difficult to assess the scope of the problem,12
but some studies report that as much as 85% of children
between the ages of 12 and 15 reported being teased or bullied
at school.13 This article defines bullying as “physical or verbal
abuse repeated over time, and involving a power imbalance.”14
The victims of bullying can become depressed, anxious,
have increased feelings of sadness and loneliness, and loss of
enjoyment, health complaints, poor school performance, and
are more likely to drop out of school.15 Workplace bullying is
also common with up to 35% of employees reporting that they
have been bullied.16 Similar to school bullying, the victims of
workplace bullying can suffer emotionally and physically. In
addition, it can harm their careers; victims have high rates of
absenteeism and reduced productivity.17 As described below, in
extreme cases, a bully can be charged with causing their victim
to commit suicide.
B. Cyber-Bullying
Although bullying has been present among teens for
centuries, twenty-first century bullying often comes in a form
that is termed “cyber-bullying.” According to the National
11. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.666 (West 2012).
12. Emily Bazalon, Defining Bullying Down, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2013,
at A23.
13. Deborah Carpenter & Christopher J. Ferguson, What is Bullying?,
NETPLACES,
http://www.netplaces.com/dealing-with-bullies/what-isbullying/facts-and-statistics.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2014) (discussing the
2001 Kaiser Family Foundation study).
14. See Bazalon, supra note 12.
15. Effects
of
Bullying,
STOPBULLYING.GOV,
http://www.stopbullying.gov/at-risk/effects/index.html (last visited Dec. 18,
2014).
16. Gary Namie & Ruth Namie, Being Bullied? Start Here, WORKPLACE
BULLYING INST., http://www.workplacebullying.org/individuals/problem/beingbullied/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2014).
17. Jerry Kennard, Workplace Bullying: The Signs and the Effects on
Men,
ABOUT.COM
(Feb.
27,
2014),
http://menshealth.about.com/cs/workhealth/a/work_bullying.htm.
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Crime Prevention Council, cyber-bullying is a problem that
affects almost half of American teens.18 Cyber-bullying is when
someone repeatedly harasses, mistreats, or makes fun of
another person online or with the use of a cell phone or other
electronic device.19 Cyber-bullying can occur when a person
pretends that he or she is someone else in order to trick
someone else online, when someone spreads lies and rumors
about another online, when someone sends or forwards mean
text messages to another, and when someone posts pictures or
videos of others online without their consent.20
The Cyberbullying Research Center has done a number of
studies to determine the prevalence, nature, and the
consequences of cyber-bulling. In the Center’s most recent
research study, 4,441 youth between the ages of 10 and 18 were
surveyed from 37 different schools.21 This study revealed that
83% of the youth surveyed used a cell phone at least once a
week and that a larger proportion of adolescents are now using
Facebook as opposed to MySpace, Twitter, and other social
networking sites.22 Out of those surveyed, 20% reported that
they experienced cyber-bullying and that they were most
frequently the target of mean or hurtful comments and
rumors.23 Moreover, in 17% of the research sample, victims of
cyber-bullying were re-victimized two or more times in a thirtyday period.24 Female cyber-bullies were more likely to spread
rumors, while male cyber-bullies were more likely to spread
hurtful pictures or videos.25
Unlike traditional bullying, cyber-bullying can be
especially pervasive.
The evolution of technological
18. See
Cyberbullying,
NAT’L
CRIME
PREVENTION
COUNCIL,
http://www.ncpc.org/topics/cyberbullying (last visited Dec. 18, 2014).
19. See Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, Teens Use of Technology
2010
February
Research,
CYBERBULLYING.Us,
http://www.cyberbullying.us/research.php (last visited Dec. 18, 2014).
20. See Cyberbullying, supra note 18.
21. See Hinduja & Patchin, supra note 19.
22. See id.
23. See Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, Cyberbullying Research
Summary: Cyberbullying and Suicide, CYBERBULLYING RES. CTR. (July 1,
2010),
http://cyberbullying.us/cyberbullying-research-summarycyberbullying-and-suicide/.
24. Id..
25. See Hinduja & Patchin, supra note 19.
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communications allows bullies to embarrass their victims in
front of enormous audiences and such communications can
never be fully erased.26 Likewise, there is a growing concern
for the consequences that both the victims and perpetrators of
bullying endure. Research has shown that cyber-bullying is
linked to suicidal ideation.27 Both youth who are bullied and
those who bully are at a greater risk for experiencing thoughts
of suicide, attempting suicides, and successfully completing
suicides.28 In fact, research shows that peer harassment
contributes to depression and hopelessness, which lay the very
foundation for suicide.29 While research shows that all forms of
bullying are significantly associated with an increase of
suicidal ideation, cyber-bullying victims were nearly twice as
likely to have attempted suicide as those who had not
experienced cyber-bullying.30
1. Recent Cases
This section focuses on two cases. First, where the cyberbully risks that his actions may lead to a suicide; and second
where the cyber-bully actively encourages the victim to take
her own life.
a. Case One - Tyler Clementi
On September 29, 2010, the lifeless body of Tyler Clementi
was found in the Hudson River.31 Just seven days prior, he
posted his final words on his Facebook status, “Jumping off the

26. See 21st Century Bullying, Crueler than Ever, NAT’L CRIME
PREVENTION
COUNCIL,
http://www.ncpc.org/resources/files/pdf/bullying/21st%20Century%20Bullying
%20-%20Crueler%20Than%20Ever.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2014).
27. See Hinduja & Patchin, supra note 23.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See Kelly Ebbels, Tragic End for a True Talent, NORTHJERSEY.COM
(Oct.
1,
2010),
http://www.northjersey.com/news/104132029_Tragic_end_for_a_true_talent.h
tml.
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gw bridge sorry.”32
Tyler committed suicide after being
humiliated during the two days prior to his suicide.33 Tyler’s
privacy was invaded when his roommate, Dharun Ravi, and
Molly Wei, covertly set up a webcam after Tyler asked Mr. Ravi
Mr. Ravi
for some privacy on September 19, 2010.34
surreptitiously viewed Tyler engaging in intimate acts with
another male, and shortly thereafter, posted on Twitter,
“Roommate asked for the room till midnight. I went into
Molly’s room and turned on my webcam. I saw him making out
with a dude. Yay.”35 Not only did Mr. Ravi watch Tyler’s
intimate encounter, but he also streamed the encounter on the
Web for all of his friends to view.36 Two days later Mr. Ravi
posted on Twitter, “I dare you to video chat me between the
hours of 9:30 and 12. Yes it’s happening again.”37 The
following day, after Tyler learned what Mr. Ravi had done,
Tyler killed himself.38
The Middlesex County Prosecutor’s Office initially charged
Mr. Ravi and Ms. Wei with two counts of invasion of privacy for
using “the camera to view and transmit a live image” of Tyler.39
A grand jury subsequently handed down a 15-count indictment
against Ravi for invasion of privacy, attempted invasion of
privacy, bias intimidation, tampering with evidence, witness
tampering, and hindering apprehension or prosecution.40 He
32. See Alison Gendar, Edgar Sandoval & Larry McShane, Rutgers
Freshman Kills Self After Classmates Use Hidden Camera to Watch His
Sexual Activity: Sources, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Sept. 30, 2010, 12:06 AM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/ny_crime/2010/09/29/2010-0929_rutgers_freshmen_busted_for_spying_on_fellow_students_online_sex_sess
ion_officia.html.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. Id.
36. See id.
37. Jessica Geen, US Teenager Kills Himself After Roommate ‘Taped
Him Having Sex with a Man’, PINK NEWS (Sept. 30, 2010, 11:08 AM),
http://www.pinknews.co.uk/2010/09/30/us-teenager-kills-himself-afterroommate-taped-him-having-sex-with-a-man/.
38. See id.
39. See Lisa W. Foderaro, Private Moment Made Public, Then a Fatal
Jump, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2010, at A1.
40. See id. Within a few weeks of Tyler Clementi’s death, three other
young people took their own lives. Seth Walsh, a thirteen-year-old, hanged
himself after being cyber-bullied because of his sexual orientation. See John
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was ultimately convicted of all counts, and received a 30-day
sentence.41
b. Case Two - Megan Meier
Thirteen-year-old Megan Meier hanged herself in her room
after a boy she met online, Josh Evans, told her that “the world
would be a better place without her.”42 Little did Megan know,
Josh Evans never existed.43 Instead, 47 year old, Lori Drew,
created a fake MySpace account and communicated with
Megan as a cruel joke after Mrs. Drew’s daughter and Megan
had a falling out.44 Drew, who knew Megan was on medication
for depression, had the fictitious boy flirt with Megan and
made Megan think he liked her.45 “He” then abruptly told her
he no longer liked her. That day, Megan killed herself. Finding
that its harassment statute did not cover the incident, the state
found no grounds to prosecute Drew.46 Federal prosecutors
sought unsuccessfully to employ a computer hacking statute to
punish Drew.47 Other than social opprobrium, which was
widespread, Drew was not punished.48
Schwartz, Bullying, Suicide, Punishment, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2010, at WK1.
So did Asher Brown, a teen from Texas, who shot himself in the head. See
Richard James, US Gay Community Reeling from ‘Epidemic’ of Suicides
Among Teenagers Taunted Over Sexuality, MAIL ONLINE (Oct. 1, 2010, 11:25
AM),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1316782/US-gay-communityreeling-epidemic-suicides-teenagers.html. Billy Lucas hanged himself at his
grandmother’s house after being bullied because of his sexual orientation, as
did fourteen-year-old, Kameron Jacobsen, who took his own life after being
taunted on Facebook because of his sexual orientation. Id.
41. He was also sentenced to 300 hours of community service, three
years’ probation, a $10,000 fine, and mandatory counseling. Michael
Koenigs, Candance Smith & Christina Ng, Rutgers Trial: Dharan Ravi
Sentenced to 30 Days in Jail, ABC NEWS (May 21, 2012),
http://abcnews.go.com/US/rutgers-trial-dharun-ravi-sentenced-30-daysjail/story?id=16394014. The lenient sentence caused a national furor. See
Kate Zernike, Judge Defends Penalty in Rutgers Spying Case, Saying It Fits
Crime, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2012, at A22.
42. See Maag, supra note 6.
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 451 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
48. Debra Cassens Weiss, Judge Overturns Conviction of Lori Drew in
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Whether homicide charges are appropriate for cyberbullies depends in large part on whether they have caused the
victim to commit suicide.49 The next sub-section lays on
general causation rules.
II. Causation Rules and Cases
The basic homicide doctrine requires that a defendant
cause harm as a condition of culpability.50 Known as “resultoriented” offenses, homicide statutes do not prohibit any
particular conduct per se, only the result of the conduct.51 A
person is culpable when he causes an unlawful death by any
voluntary act52 accompanied by the appropriate mens rea. In
contrast, most offenses focus on prohibiting specific acts —
robbing, raping, carjacking, drunk driving. One could say that
homicide statutes are victim-oriented rather than defendantoriented in that they look at the result, not the act.
It is with result-oriented crimes, the largest group of which
is homicides that causation issues arise.53 Typically, it is when
Cyberbullying
Case,
ABA
J.
(Aug.
31,
2009),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/judge_overturns_conviction_of_lori_d
rew_in_cyberbullying_case/.
49. Of course, the actor would also have to have the appropriate mens
rea for a homicide charge.
50. As I explained in an earlier work, result-oriented crimes are those
where there is some conduct, stated either explicitly or implicitly, and a
consequence of that conduct. For example, robbery is defined as the forcible
taking of the property of another. Here, the defendant’s conduct is the
“forcible taking.” There is no result element. The effect of a successful
robbery is that the victim has less property, but robbery is not a “resultoriented” crime under the above definition. There is no consequence separate
and apart from the conduct, and thus, no “result” element to the offense.
Compare robbery to murder. A person is guilty of murder when he
“intentionally causes the death of another human being.” Here there is no
explicitly stated conduct element –any act or omission will suffice. The result
element is “causes the death.” The death is a consequence of the actor’s
conduct. See generally Audrey Rogers, New Technology, Old Defenses:
Internet Sting Operations and Attempt Liability, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 477, 485
n.26 (2004).
51. Id.
52. The voluntary act could be by omission.
53. Some scholars state that the actus reus of an offense contains a
causation element in that social harm is caused by all crimes. See, e.g.,
JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 180 (3d ed. 2001).
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a victim’s death occurs in a manner different than intended or
risked by the defendant. For example, if a defendant intends to
cause a person’s death by shooting her, and instead she dies of
fright upon seeing his raised gun, a question arises as to
whether he caused her death. Similarly, if two men engage in
a drag race and one of them swerves into an oncoming truck, a
questions arises as to who caused the truck driver’s death.
The fundamental question posed when death occurs in
an atypical fashion is stated well in the Model Penal Code,
which asks whether the actual result is “not too remote or
accidental in its occurrence as to have a just bearing on the
actor’s liability.”54 The courts have developed a two-part
analysis to answer this question. The defendant’s conduct
must be both the actual and legal cause of death. To assess the
actual cause prong, courts ask whether “but for” the
defendant’s actions, would the death have occurred when it
did.55 This step casts a wide net that eliminates only the most
peripheral of actions.56 One could say, for example, that but for
a defendant’s mother giving birth to him, he could not have
killed the victim, and but for her mother’s birth of her, etc.
Therefore, most causation analysis focuses on the second
prong of legal causation to narrow down all those incidents that
may have filled the “but-for” net. One way to measure whether
a defendant is the legal cause of death is to see if he is the
proximate cause of death. Thus proximity in and of itself is not
the requirement, but just the tool. This tool uses foreseeability
as the main gauge of legal cause. But even foreseeable results
may not suffice as legal cause. In certain instances, the link
between the defendant’s actions and the harmful result is
broken by intervening forces.
The intervening force relevant to this article is the victim’s
own actions that contribute to her death. Even if foreseeable,
such actions may break the causal chain. Why is this the case?
Professor Dressler acknowledges that the vast majority of causation problems
occur in homicide offenses.
54. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03 (1985).
55. See DRESSLER, supra note 53, at 184.
56. Id. For example, if defendant gives victim poison that would cause
death in one hour, but after five minutes, victim is struck by lightning that
instantly kills him the defendant is not the but-for cause of death. Id. at 18687.
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Two historical explanations exist: First, under English common
law, suicide was a crime that resulted in post-mortem
punishment in the form of forfeiture of land and non-religious
burial.57 Most likely the latter punishment stemmed from the
views of most religions that suicide was a grave sin, as it
violated the commandment not to kill.58 The exceptions to
punishment of the suicide actor were limited to instances
where he was insane or compromised by pain or depression,
rather than by “anger or ill will.”59 Thus, the early common
law recognized a distinction between suicides committed with a
diminished capacity versus those committed with free will.
Even as the prevalence of suicide as a crime diminished, its
underlying distinction remained as a basis for determining
culpability of third persons to the suicide. As discussed more
fully below, the common-law distinction also applies as the
basis of the related, but separate crime of assisting a suicide.60
A second reason for the rule that a victim’s action breaks
the causal chain is grounded in tort rules of contributory
negligence. The early common law of torts held that a
plaintiff’s contributory negligence barred any tort recovery,
mainly because it was thought impossible to properly apportion
responsibility. Most jurisdictions have rejected the harsh
effects of a contributory negligence rule in favor of
apportionment through comparative negligence principles;
nevertheless, vestiges of the ban remain by analogy in the
criminal law.61
57. Sue Woolf Brenner, Note, Undue Influence in the Criminal Law: A
Proposed Analysis of the Criminal Offense of “Causing Suicide”, 47 ALB. L.
REV. 62, 64 (1982); Catherine D. Shaffer, Note, Criminal Liability for
Assisting Suicide, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 348, 349 (1986).
58. See generally G. Steven Neeley, The Right to Self-Directed Death:
Reconsidering an Ancient Proscription, 36 CATH. LAWYER 111 (1995).
59. See Brenner, supra note 57.
60. See infra notes and accompanying text.
61. The policy of the law in this respect is founded upon the
inability of:
human tribunals to mete out exact justice. A perfect code
would render each man responsible for the unmixed
consequences of his own default; but the common law, in
view of the impossibility of assigning all effects to their
respective causes, refuses to interfere in those cases where
negligence is the issue, at the instance of one whose hands
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The following sub-section describes various scenarios that
implicate the ability to freely choose to take one’s own life.
Generally, when a victim seeks to escape imminent physical or
mental injury inflicted by a defendant by committing suicide,
the causal chain remains intact between the defendant’s act
and the victim’s death.
A. Infliction of Physical Injuries That Lead to Suicide
It is well-settled that when a victim is assaulted by a
defendant, the victim’s actions to take his or her own life are
not a superseding cause that breaks the causal connection
between the defendant’s actions and the victim’s death.
Therefore, defendants can and have been charged with
are not free from the stain of contributory fault . . . .
CHARLES BEACH FISK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
12 (1885).

OF

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

It is said again, that the true theory upon which the rule
rests is that the defendant is not the cause of the injury if
the plaintiff's negligence contributes to it; but this is a very
superficial view. If it is meant that the defendant is not the
sole cause, the argument only goes around in a circle, and if
it is meant that the defendant is liable every time he is the
sole cause of an injury, it is not true. "The true ground,"
says Dr. Wharton, "for the doctrine is that, by the
interposition of the plaintiff's independent will, the causal
connection between the defendant's negligence and the
injury is broken." It is also sometimes assumed to rest upon
the maxim volenti non fit injuria, but the objection to this
position, as well as to Dr. Wharton's definition, is that
negligence, in its very essence, negatives the idea of an
exercise of the will. A person whose negligence causes an
injury cannot be spoken of with any accuracy of expression
as "willing" it. Negligence can only be conceived upon the
hypothesis that the will, as to the particular condition, is
inactive. In my judgment no more satisfactory reason for
the rule in question has been assigned than that which
assumes it to have been founded upon considerations of
public policy. We need not seek for any better reason for a
rule of law than that, among all the possible rules that
might be adopted, it is plainly the best—that indeed it is the
only rule upon the subject for an instant practicable.
Id. at 12-13 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
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homicides, even though the victims cause their own immediate
death by committing suicide. The typical rationale is that the
defendant’s actions rendered the victim irresponsible so that
the suicide was not the product of free will. For example, in
People v. Lewis, 62 the defendant and the victim were brothersin-law who engaged in an altercation that resulted in the
victim being shot in the abdomen.63 Although medical evidence
established that the wound would have caused the victim’s
death in about an hour, within a few minutes of being
wounded, the victim took a knife and cut his own throat
causing the victim to die five minutes later. The Court was
faced with the dilemma of whether the victim’s action of killing
himself by slashing his throat, which was indeed the
immediate cause of his death, should acquit the defendant of
manslaughter.64
The Court ruled that it must look to the time of death and
determine if the wound inflicted by the defendant contributed
to the victim’s death.65 It held that when the victim slashed his
throat, the gunshot wound was contributing to the death, the
defendant was properly convicted of manslaughter.66
The same principle of culpability applies to cases where
the victim refuses medical treatment for her wounds or pulls
out intravenous tubes that are the immediate cause of death.
The underlying rationale is that the defendant is responsible
for destroying the victim’s desire to live. For example, in
People v. Macklin, the defendant shot the victim when the
victim showed up at the defendant’s house with others to fulfill
a debt that the defendant’s girlfriend owed the victim.67 The
victim was shot in the neck and a tracheotomy and breathing
tubes were inserted into the victim to enable the victim to

62. 57 P. 470, 473 (Cal. 1899).
63. See id. at 471.
64. See id. at 471-72.
65. See id. at 473.
66. See id. This principle is applied regardless of whether the wound
inflicted upon the victim before the committed suicide is mortal or nonmortal. See, e.g., United States v. Hamilton, 182 F. Supp. 548, 549 (D.D.C.
1960).
67. See People v. Macklin, No. 190994, 1999 WL 33435973, at *1 (Mich.
Ct. App. Sept. 7, 1999).
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breathe.68 At some point the tubes were detached from the
victim and he died as a result of the absence of the tubes.69
The defense argued that the victim’s medical condition was
stable, that he was recovering from the gunshot wound, and
that he committed suicide, which, allegedly, was an
intervening cause that broke the causal chain in his homicide
charge.70 The court disagreed, holding that the victim’s suicide
was a natural and probable complication of the gunshot wound
that caused the need for intubation.71
What is significant in the refusal of treatment or removal
of life-saving devices cases is that the courts do not always rest
their rulings on a finding that defendant rendered the victim
irresponsible so that the suicide was not an act of free will. To
the contrary, some courts rely on a person’s right to freely and
voluntarily choose to die as the rationale for finding that
exercising this right does not relieve the defendant of causal
responsibility.72 As explained by one court, the basis of
defendant’s culpability is that he “forged a causative link
between the initial injury and death and was a sufficiently
direct and contributing event which eventually resulted in
death.”73 What could break the causal chain is a sufficient
length of time and recovery from defendant’s act and a
suicide.74
Why should it be that the choice to commit suicide that is
freely and reasonably made does not break the causal chain?
One explanation was offered in a leading treatise:
[S]uicide is not abnormal when B acts out of
extreme pain of wounds inflicted by A or when
the wound has rendered him irresponsible.
Although voluntary harm-doing usually suffices

68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See id. at *2. Defendant also argued that the cause of death could
have been gross negligence committed by the nurse in removing the tubes. Id.
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., People v. Caldwell, 692 N.E.2d 448 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998);
People v. Velez, 602 N.Y.S.2d 758 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1993).
73. Velez, 602 N.Y.S.2d at 762.
74. Id.
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to break the chain of legal cause, this should not
be so when A causes B to commit suicide by
creating a situation so cruel and revolting that
death is preferred.75
The key factors in finding that a suicide does not break the
causal chain is the defendant’s commission of a violent crime
that resulted in the victim’s physical pain and trauma, with the
suicide occurring shortly thereafter; a finding of lack of free
will is not essential.
B. Infliction of Mental Injuries That Lead to Suicide
Whether the foregoing rule applied to non-physical injuries
was the focus of State v. Stephenson, a case famous both for its
causation holding and its larger narrative in helping curtail the
prominence of the KKK in the United States. Because the
infliction of mental anguish is at the heart of current cyberbullying suicide cases, a detailed discussion of the case follows.

75. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 6.4, at 365-66 (5th ed. 2010); see
People v. Macklin, No. 190994, 1999 WL 33435973, *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept.
7, 1999). This article looks at suicide and whether the defendant has caused
it, rather than the specific separate crime of aiding a suicide that is more
commonly used when a person helps a terminally ill patient kill him or
herself. See generally Shaffer, supra note 57, at 348. In the latter case, the
person’s desire to die pre-dates any action by the defendant, and it is much
more likely that courts will find that the victim’s actions alone are the cause
of his demise. Finding that a person who intentionally aids another to kill
himself should be a crime, many jurisdictions enacted assisted suicide
statutes that codified the distinction between providing the means to commit
suicide and actively participating in the suicide by performing the physical
act that causes death. See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 401 (West 2014); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11 § 645 (West 2014); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.30 (McKinney 2014).
The Kevorkian cases highlight this division. See People v. Kevorkian, 527
N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1974). Dr. Kevorkian, a prominent and zealous advocate
of physician–assisted suicides, developed a “suicide machine” to assist
terminally-ill individuals who wished to die. He was indicted on two counts
of murder after two women died using his machine with him at their sides,
but with the women activating the machine. The Supreme Court of Michigan
ultimately ruled that Dr. Kevorkian could not be charged with their deaths
because he did not participate in the “final overt act that causes death.” Id. at
741. It was only after Dr. Kevorkian personally injected lethal drugs into a
patient that he was convicted of murder. See Dirk Johnson, Kevorkian
Sentenced to 10 to 25 years in Prison, N.Y. TIMES, April 14, 1999, at A21.
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The case arose in Indiana in 1925. The Ku Klux Klan was
at the height of its power in the United States, Indiana was its
stronghold with over 250,000 members,76 and David Curtiss
Stephenson was the Grand Dragon of its Ku Klux Klan.77
Stephenson accumulated a great amount of wealth from the
position and used his power and wealth to support political
candidates. By 1925 over half the members of the Indiana
General Assembly, the Governor of Indiana, and many other
high-ranking members of the government were all members of
the Klan.78 As Stephenson bragged to people, “I am the law in
Indiana.”79
In 1924, Madge Oberholzer attended a dinner at the
Governor’s mansion, where she met Stephenson, and he was
instantly attracted to her.80 Madge went on two dates with
him; on the second date, he revealed that he was the Grand
Dragon of the Ku Klux Klan. Incensed, she immediately broke
off the relationship. On March 27, 1925, Stephenson called
her, and asked her to come to his home about a new, important
job.81 When she arrived at his home, he overpowered her,
forcing her to drink several glasses of alcohol until she became
sick and nearly passed out. Stephenson then had two of his
bodyguards carry her into a car, where she fainted. When she
awoke, she was on Stephenson’s private train, on its way to
Chicago.82 There he raped her several times, also mutilating
her, until she blacked out.83 Madge thought to kill herself with
Stephenson’s gun, but wanting to spare her mother disgrace,
decided to poison herself, whereby death would occur more
76. Ku
Klux
Klan
in
Indiana,
IN.GOV,
http://www.in.gov/library/2848.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2014).
77. DAVID BODENHAMER & ROBERT G. BARROWS, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
INDIANAPOLIS 1296-97 (1994).
78. Indiana
Klan,
WIKIPEDIA
(Oct.
9,
2014,
7:00
PM),
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indiana_Klan.
79. WILLIAM LUTHOLTZ, GRAND DRAGON: D.C. STEPHENSON AND THE KU
KLUX KLAN 43, 89 (1993).
80. Id. See also Karen Abbott, “Murder Wasn’t Very Pretty”: The Rise and
Fall
of
D.C.
Stephenson,
SMITHSONIAN.COM
(Aug.
30,
2012),
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/murder-wasnt-very-pretty-the-riseand-fall-of-dc-stephenson-18935042/?no-ist.
81. Id.
82. Stephenson v. State, 179 N.E. 633, 635 (Ind. 1932).
83. Id.
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slowly and to perhaps make it look less like a suicide.84
Madge asked Stephenson to let her leave the hotel to
purchase sundry items. With one of Stephenson’s colleagues
escorting her, she went to a drug store, where she bought
poison, which she secretly took back at the hotel. She died on
April 14, 1925, after giving a dying declaration that recounted
what had happened to her. Medical experts laid the cause of
death to a combination of the poison she took and the injuries
Stephenson inflicted during the rape.
Stephenson was arrested and charged with rape and
murder. At trial, he argued that it was Madge’s own act that
caused her death. The jury rejected this claim and found
Stephenson guilty of killing her. The finding was affirmed by
the Supreme Court of Indiana, which undertook a detailed
analysis of the causation issue, raised once again by
Stephenson on appeal. The court agreed that an independent,
intervening cause will eliminate defendant’s acts as a
proximate cause of death. Nevertheless, the court noted wellsettled primary and secondary authority that established
where a victim takes her own life because she has been
physically attacked by the defendant, and is therefore
“rendered irresponsible by the wound,” the defendant is
responsible for causing her death.85 Similarly when a victim is
trying to flee from further attack and exposes herself to harm,
the causal link remains.86
The significance of the Stephenson ruling is that the court
stated that the injury that renders the victim irresponsible is
not limited to physical wounds. Thus, when Stephenson
repeatedly attempted to rape her and inflicted both physical
and mental wounds upon Madge that rendered her “distracted
by pain and shame so inflicted upon her,”87 he was guilty of
causing her death, notwithstanding her suicide. Moreover, the
court stressed that Stephenson was ever-present because of his
cohorts (and, I believe, because of the power he held in
Indiana,) Madge could feel that she had no viable alternative to
84. Id.
85. Id. at 648-49.
86. Id. (citing Rex v. Beech, [1912] 23 Cox Crim. Cas. 181 (Crim. App.
1912), accord Rex v. Valade, [1915] 26 Can. Cr. Cas. 112 (Can. Que.)).
87. Id. at 655.
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escape continued sexual assault than by committing suicide.
The court stated that her situation was no different than
throwing oneself out of window to escape. It concluded that
Stephenson, “rendered the deceased distracted and mentally
irresponsible, and that such was the natural and probable
consequence of such unlawful and criminal treatment.”88
Some early scholars have criticized Stephenson on the
grounds that “shame and disgrace” rather than prevention of
further harm was the reason for Madge’s suicide and that this
was insufficient to hold Stephenson culpable.89 Their criticism
rests on a reluctance to acknowledge that defendant’s acts
could have rendered her irresponsible or that mental harm is a
sufficiently natural and probable consequence of rape so as to
lead to suicide. Whether this is because of archaic notions of
mental injury is unclear, but one can hazard a guess that at
the time of the Stephenson case in 1932, there was considerable
skepticism about mental impairments.
We can sum up with the uncontroversial rule that when
the defendant constrains the victim’s free will by inflicting
great physical or mental pain, he has caused the victim to
commit suicide and is therefore guilty of a homicide.90
88. Id. at 649. As a coda to the case, the outrage over his conduct toward
Madge lead to the downfall of the KKK in Indiana and nationwide, so that
from its height of popularity in 1924 when the KKK’s membership numbered
6,000,000, it plunged to 30,000 by 1930—with most scholars in agreement
that the Oberholzer case was the catalyst for Klan disenchantment. The
Various Shady Lives Of The Ku Klux Klan, 85 TIME 32, Apr. 9, 1965,
http://web.a.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail/detail?sid=c1f7385a-0077-4f00-b242eaac089e9e7f%40sessionmgr4003&vid=2&hid=4114&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWh
vc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#db=a9h&AN=54030426.
89. Lester P. Schoene, et al., Homicide- responsibility for Victim’s
Suicide Following Assault, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1261 (1932).
90. In contrast to scenarios where the victim wants to die, the law
recognizes instances where a victim’s actions will be charged back to a
defendant even where the victim has free will. The criteria are joint activity
and a victim who risks, rather than seeks, death. The classic example is the
Russian roulette scenario. Here players who jointly agree to play a game that
involves spinning a gun’s cylinder, then pointing the gun to one’s own head,
and firing. Should death occur, courts have held that the game participants
are guilty of reckless homicide on the theory that the defendants’
participation and encouragement caused the victim’s death. The free will of
the victim in choosing to engage in the risky behavior does not break the
causal chain when death is foreseeable. See, e.g., State v. McFadden, 320
N.W.2d 608 (Iowa 1982); Commonwealth v. Atencio, 189 N.E.2d 223 (Mass.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/12

18

2014

DEATH BY BULLYING

361

III. Comparative Liability
As described above, traditional rules cut off a defendant’s
responsibility for a person’s suicide unless he rendered the
victim mentally irresponsible or otherwise compromised the
victim’s free will, such as by inflicting serious physical or
mental injuries. At issue is whether the law should move from
this “all-or-nothing” causation approach to one of comparative
culpability.
When the bullying victim intentionally kills himself, the
current law relieves the bully of any responsibility in causing
the suicide unless he rendered the victim irresponsible or
inflicted serious physical injuries. Yet there is clearly some
connection between the bully and bullied. Professor Vera
Bergelson advocates that the relationship between victim and
perpetrator be formally recognized in the criminal law, rather
than in merely these few isolated examples via a principle of
“conditionality of rights.”91 She explains that, “Pursuant to
this principle, the perpetrator’s liability should be reduced to
the extent the victim, by his own acts, has diminished his right
not to be harmed.”92 By that principle, a person may lose some
rights due to his own actions. If that happens, the perpetrator
may not be guilty of violating the rights that have been lost.
Should Professor Bergelson’s conditionality of rights
principle work in reverse to inculpate rather than to
exculpate?93 In situations such as Stephenson that involve the
involuntary reduction of rights, she acknowledges causation is
“almost never an all-or-nothing issue,” 94 yet the criminal law
traditionally has refused to acknowledge this fact.
She
suggests that tort law approaches to comparative causation

1963). But see Commonwealth v. Root, 170 A.2d 310 (Pa. 1961). Since the
victim only risks death in these cases, they are not squarely on point.
91. Vera Bergelson, Victims and Perpetrators: An Argument for
Comparative Liability in Criminal Law, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 385, 387
(2005).
92. Id. at 390.
93. A special thanks to my former colleague, Professor Luis Chiesa for
his help on this point.
94. Bergelson, supra note 91, at 479.
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may work well in the criminal law context.95 Helpful tort
approaches include examining the relative responsibility of
victim and perpetrator.96 Thus in the criminal law context, the
questions a jury would need to answer are two-fold: (1) the
difference a particular act makes to an outcome and (2) the
legal and moral weight we assign to different types of
behavior.
According to Professor Bergelson, comparative causation
analysis best explains the Stephenson outcome.97 For the first
question, the jurors would be likely to conclude that
Stephenson’s actions were at least as important a cause of
Madge Oberholtzer’s death as her own—but for him, she would
not have taken the poison, or have been denied medical
assistance.98 On the second question, Professor Bergelson
suggests the defendant is the cause of death because, “the
jurors would have to compare the legal and moral significance
of cold-blooded, premeditated criminal acts committed by
Stephenson and hysterical, semi-rational acts of Madge
Oberholtzer committed in response to the attack she had
suffered.”99 In her view, this is a better analysis of the result
than the one employed by the Stephenson court that stretched
to find guilt under traditional causation principles.100
95. Id. at 453.
96. Id. at 481.
She suggests other tort-based tests, such as
counterfactual similarity, and the “necessary element of a sufficient set.” Id.
at 480. Professor Simons is most critical of applying these two tests to
criminal law analysis. See Simons, infra note 102.
97. See Bergelson, supra note 91, at 482.
98. Id. at 483.
99. Id.
100. Id. As further support for her conditionality of rights principle,
Professor Bergelson examines scenarios where the victim has voluntarily
reduced his rights, such as by drag-racing or playing Russian Roulettte.
Courts have reached divergent results in these cases with some finding the
defendants caused the victims’ deaths and others holding they have not. Id.
at 422. She posits her comparative culpability formula supports inculpating
defendants for the victim’s death. She proposes that, “A more realistic and
fair approach [than to completely absolve or blame defendants] would be to
apportion responsibility among all parties who have contributed to the
criminal outcome,” by punishing the survivors of risky games of a type of
reckless endangerment offense. Id. at 472. She does not go so far as to say
the defendants caused the victim’s death, but does propose that defendants
have a connection to the victim’s actions and should be punished based on
this connection.
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Another scholar, Professor Kenneth Simons, is mostly
critical of Professor Bergelson’s theory has applied it to
defenses such as consent, self-defense and provocation.101
Nevertheless, he agrees that Professor Bergelson’s concept of
relative causal contribution “is indeed a coherent and plausible
approach.”102 He further acknowledges that while the law
“currently employs proximate cause criteria in an all-ornothing manner, but it would indeed be possible to employ such
criteria flexibly, not dichotomously.”103
Professor Bergelson supports a comparative approach as
support for her position that a victim’s actions should be
considered to mitigate a defendant’s culpability, rather than
artificially ignoring the victim’s role in crimes. My contention
is that a conditionality of rights principles can work equally
well to inculpate. Accordingly, we should not treat victim
suicide as automatically breaking the causal chain and
defendant’s contribution to the harm.
Whether we use
causation principles or create other crimes to punish a
defendant’s part in causing the death of one who kills himself,
what we are saying is that there is a connection between them
that needs recognition.
Applying Professor Bergelson’s test to the Clementi and
Drew cases, we would ask first whether the bullies were the
but-for cause of death. For the first question, a jury is likely to
conclude that Drew’s action of creating a false web persona
that taunted the victim “w[as] at least as important a cause of
Meghan Meier’s death as her own act of hanging herself.”104
101. Kenneth W. Simons, The Relevance Of Victim Conduct In Tort And
Criminal Law, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 541 (2005). His position is that the
conditionality of rights principle does not provide a singular, helpful theory
by which to judge victim culpability; instead it merely gives different means
of addressing consent, self-defense and provocation. Id. at 562-63.
102. Id. at 551-52.
103. Id. at 552.
104. Traditional but-for causation analysis does not require the
defendant’s act be the sole cause of death; it is sufficient for it to be a
“substantial factor” in the death. See WAYNE LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 6.4(b),
at 653-65 (5th ed. 2010). Whether Meghan Meier had pre-existing emotional
problems would not relieve the defendant of culpability as the law requires
that one “takes the victim as she finds her.” Id. § 6.4(f)(2), at 364. Thus, if a
defendant stabs a person who because of a blood-clotting disorder bleeds to
death, the defendant is not relieved of responsibility for causing the victim’s
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Similarly, Ravi’s act of secretly taping and tweeting about
Tyler’s homosexual encounter was a substantial factor in the
suicide.
Under a comparative causation approach, the second prong
assesses the “legal and moral weight we assign to different
types of behavior.”105 Lori Drew, an adult repeatedly preyed on
a young girl via fake web postings to perform a sick act of
revenge for a supposed slight on her own daughter. Drew is
the epitome of a cyberbully because of the imbalance of power
between her and Meghan, and the repeated acts of bullying.106
A jury should have been asked to assess whether Drew’s acts
was a cause of Meghan’s death; this would have been possible if
the prosecution had pursed homicide charges against Drew
rather than asserting that there were no state cyberbullying or
harassment laws under which to charge Drew.107
The Clementi case is less likely to result in finding Ravi
culpable for homicide under a comparative causation analysis.
At first blush, there are many similarities between the
Clementi and Stephenson cases. First, in both cases the victims
suffered shame and humiliation- Clementi by his publicly
outing as a homosexual, and Oberholtzer by being raped.
Second, both could be said to be under their tormentors’ control
with no means of escape. Stephenson physically controlled his
victim by kidnapping her and keeping her under the watch of
his cronies and employees. She knew he was the powerful head
of the KKK who bragged about controlling the courts and law
enforcement in his state. Clementi was virtually controlled by
Ravi because the pervasive nature of the internet made it
impossible for him to escape.
Despite these similarities, Stephenson’s violent beating,
biting and raping of Oberholtzer is the decisive difference
between the situations. The weight a jury gave to these actions
death. Id. Even if the defendant does not intend to inflict a deadly injury,
courts have found them responsible, despite victim’s pre-existing condition,
although the rule is less definitive. Id. § 3.12(h), at 317.
105. See United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 451 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
106. Id.
107. The outrage over the Drew case led the Missouri legislature to pass
a criminal harassment law. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.090 (2012). Critics
have attacked the law as unconstitutionally vague. One wonders why the
prosecutors did not charge Drew with reckless child endangerment.
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was a major factor in convicting him of Oberholtzer’s death by
suicide. What Ravi did to Clementi was less nefarious. It most
likely would appear to a jury as an extremely stupid, juvenile
act that, under the conditionality of rights test, would not
inculpate Ravi for Clementi’s death.108 In this scenario, a
better result in measuring the interrelationship between the
defendant and the victim is to say defendant deserves
punishment, but not for a homicide.109
IV. Conclusion
Bullying and suicide are an ever-increasing problem in the
Internet age. Studies have shown that bullying victims have a
higher suicide rate than their non-bullied contemporaries.
Prosecutions that paint victims of bullying who have
committed suicide as mentally unstable may reinforce the
sense of hopelessness and helplessness others who are bullied
feel. The goal should be to empower bullying victims to seek
other avenues to escape their bullies, to feel that they have
choices and that suicide is not a good option. A comparative
causation analysis would not treat the suicide as an automatic
break in the causal chain or mark the victim as mentally
unstable. Instead, it would look to a person’s role in another’s
death; by inculpating the bully, we are saying that he deserves
punishment because his actions had an effect on the suicide
victim.
For egregious bullying cases, prosecutors can and should
consider possible homicide charges. Whether a jury will be able
to properly assess the defendant’s role in a victim’s death
requires us to reject victim suicide as either an automatic
break in the causal chain or the product of mental
irresponsibility. Instead, a jury should consider factors such as
108. While Ravi and Clementi do not fit squarely within the definitions
of bully and victim since there was not an obvious power imbalance between
them, we could posit that a gay young adult is in powerless situation in a
majoritarian heterosexual world. However, to fit squarely within the
Stephenson model, the prosecution would have to paint Clementi as mentally
irresponsible, an undesirable option.
109. See Foderaro, supra note 39 and accompanying text. Ravi’s thirtyday sentence provoked much public outrage as too lenient; appeals of the
verdict and the sentence by the defense and prosecutions, respectively, are
pending.
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the imbalance of power between the bully and his victim, the
nature and severity of the bullying, and whether avoidance is
possible.
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